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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes research conducted regarding efforts to enhance
organizational learning within an automobile manufacturing PTO. A framework for
organizational learning is presented which emphasizes the need for both single- and
double-loop learning. Two specific initiatives undertaken by the PTO, the Book of
Knowledge and manufacturing tech clubs, are examined in the context of their
development as organizational learning systems. The Book of Knowledge is a computer
based tool to be used by platform team members to share significant learning throughout
the organization. This research assisted in establishing initial system specifications and
developing a prototype system. Tech clubs are cross-platform groups organized by
function or technical expertise. The communication patterns between club members are
examined using experimentally designed survey techniques. Additionally, an example
related to implementation of a hard-top door design is investigated via designed
experimentation to examine organizational learning in the context of problem solving.
Finally, a learning history is prepared and its contents analyzed to assist the PTO in
understanding the issues surrounding the hard-top door implementation.
Recommendations are presented related to enhancing the overall learning system
of the PTO, based on the research and prevalent theory related to organizational learning.
Dedicated resources with primary responsibilities linked to development of the Book of
Knowledge are suggested, along with expanded responsibility and authority for the tech
clubs. Learning histories are recommended as tools to document single-loop learning, with
the potential for dissemination meetings as forums to stimulate double-loop learning.
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Department Head, Materials Science and Engineering
James M. Utterback
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.0 Background and Problem Definition
In an effort to reduce the lead-time and increase the effectiveness of the product
development cycle, many companies have institutionalized cross-functional teams or
product platform teams. A significant challenge for the platform team organization (PTO)
is to promote learning between the various teams so that, in the very least, successes are
replicated and errors are minimized. Many organizations have sought to do this by
embracing the concept of organizational learning. Generally, organizational learning can
be defined as:
the ability to capture, retain and incorporate knowledge, expertise
and lessons learned from individual and collective perspectives for
the continued growth and development of the organization.
This definition implies both a learning product and a learning process, as well as different
types of organizational learning. The definition will be augmented in the framework
presented in the next section, which draws upon the works of Argyris and Schonl 23,
Schein4, Senge5'6 and other scholars of organizational learning.
This thesis describes research conducted regarding efforts to enhance
organizational learning within an automobile manufacturing PTO. Two specific initiatives
undertaken by the PTO are examined in the context of the development of organizational
learning systems. Additionally, an example related to implementation of a particular door
design is investigated via designed experimentation to examine organizational learning in
the context of problem solving. The methodology section of this chapter will further
define these activities.
1.1 Framework for Organizational Learning
Since the 1980's numerous publications have been offered related to organizational
learning and many corporations have aspired to become "learning organizations". To help
accomplish this, these organizations should consider a series of questions:
1. What does organizational earning mean for us and what are its
benefits and evidences?
2. What conditions impede organizational learning and are these
conditions present within our organization?
3. What conditions promote productive organizational learning, and
how can we help these conditions occur while canceling impeding
conditions?
This framework attempts to provide help to answer these questions by presenting
concepts from prevalent theory on organizational learning.
1.1.1 Foundations
Central to organizational learning ideology is the concept of theory of action,
which is used to examine the behavior of an organization. In Organizational Learning: A
Theory of Action Perspective, Argyris and Schon give the following discussion of the
concept:
A full schema for a theory of action would be as follows: in situation
S, if you want to achieve consequence C, under assumptions a ... n,
do A ...
The theory of action is a control mechanism for the user, and can be used to explain or
predict behavior. There is a distinction between the espoused theory that one posits and
communicates to others, and the theory-in-use which governs the actual behavior of the
user. The theory-in-use may be constructed from observations, and is implicit in the
performance of a pattern of activity. The theory-in-use may conflictwith the espoused
theory, and the user may be unaware of the inconsistency.
From the broad definition of organizational learning given in the previous section
and the behavioral concepts discussed above, two types of organizational learning can
now be distinguished. The distinction employed in this framework was originated by
Ashby 7 and has been popularized by Argyris: single- and double-loop learning. Single-
loop learning employs error detection feedback to adjust the organization's actions such
that the error is resolved. This type of learning, similar to continuous process
improvement, leads to enhanced performance of organizational tasks but leaves the
theory-in-use unchanged. Double-loop learning explores and can restructure the values
and criteria through which the organization defines what it means by improved
performance. Unlike single-loop learning, double-loop learning can result in altered
values, strategies and assumptions underlying the theory-in-use.
Both forms of learning are productive and necessary for organizational
development. However, many companies tend to define and attempt to encourage
organizational learning solely in the single-loop context. This is likely insufficient for the
ultra-competitive environment that most firms face. Indeed, companies are embracing
management philosophies which call for discontinuous improvement and / or dramatically
re-engineered processes; often these philosophies call for radical cultural change. Of the
distinctions described, double-loop learning is the only mechanism by which cultural
change may occur. Culture is defined by Schein as:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group learned as it solved its
problems of surviving and adapting to its external environment and
integrating its internal processes to ensure the capacity to continue to
survive and adapt.
These shared basic assumptions correspond to theories-in-use. Schein discusses espoused
values as a level of culture, and promotes observation of visible organizational structures
(artifacts) and espoused values as tools to analyze basic shared assumptions. If this model
is embraced, then cultural change can only occur via double-loop learning.
1.1.2 Evidences
When both single- and double-loop learning occur as the norm, then by definition
the organization should experience improved performance and cultural change. These
experiences can be manifested in numerous forms. The work of Senge' et al. suggests that
the evidences of a learning organization include the following:
1. Synergy exists in teams / work groups that will allow them to be more
effective (intelligent) as a group than as individuals. The members
challenge and build on each other's ideas to develop superior products
and processes.
2. The organization is aware of and values the underlying tacit knowledge
base of its people. Systems and processes are developed to extract,
cultivate and make implicit understandings explicit.
3. People are encouraged to embrace a system 's perspective of the
organization by learning what's going on at all levels and understanding
how their actions influence others. This experience is facilitated and
institutionalized through cross-training, job rotation and dialogue which
(among other things) links causes and effects.
4. People are encouraged to take risks, openly assess results and
acknowledge yet learn from mistakes, rather than being punished
Systems and processes allow the entire organization to benefit from such
learning.
In evaluating this list, one finds that the items correlate to values commonly espoused by
many firms. Terms such as "empowered work-force" and "teams" are examples. If this is
the case, then one must ask why these organizations have not attained the goal of being
learning organizations since they espouse the concepts. Evidently, the theories-in-use are
not in total alignment with the espoused values. Certain behaviors or activities occurring
in the firm must be at work impeding organizational learning.
1.1.3 Barriers to Learning
Argyris and Schon present several systems of behavior that work to impede
organizational learning. These include inhibitory loops and organizational defensive
routines. Inhibitory loops are self-reinforcing cycles where conditions for error in
organizational theory of action provoke behaviors which reinforce the error conditions.
The conditions for error include vagueness, ambiguity, untestability, undiscussibility and
uncertainty - all of which conceal error and make it uncorrectable. As an example, when
an issue is potentially embarrassing, people tend not to discuss it, and the fact that they are
not discussing the issue is also undiscussable. This may exacerbate the level of vagueness
and ambiguity surrounding the issue, and the issue continues unresolved for lack of
discussion. Organizational defensive routines are actions and policies that are intended
to protect individuals from experiencing embarrassment or threat, while at the same time
preventing individuals (or the organization as a whole) from identifying the causes of the
embarrassment or threat so that the appropriate problems can be corrected. As may be
surmised, inhibitory loops and organizational defensive routines are interconnected.
1.1.4 Promoting learning
In order to promote learning, incongruent theories-in-use must be aligned with the
organization's vision and espoused theories for learning. In short, the organization must
work to create an environment where the evidences described in section 1.1.2 can flourish.
It is accomplished through double-loop learning, examining the theories-in-use and their
underlying values for inconsistencies and impediments. This involves developing a culture
where conditions for error can be eliminated. It includes a medium where mistaken
assumptions can be reformulated, vagueness made specific and previously undiscussable
issues become discussible. The nature of a learning organization is evolutionary, with
continual learning and improvement of the learning process being primary goals. Modern
theory presents variables and action strategies to help work towards achieving these goals.
Argyris and Schon propose a theory-in-use where significant actions are evaluated
in terms of the degree to which they help generate valid and useful data, share problems in
a manner leading to productive dialogue, and solve problems such that they remain solved
without reducing existing levels of problem-solving effectiveness. This involves double-
loop learning as individuals confront basic assumptions behind others' present views (and
actions) and invite confrontation of their own basic assumptions. The end result of such a
model is that the mechanisms for learning impediments are destroyed as the conditions for
error and protective (defense) routines are eliminated. Necessary competencies for
materializing the model include skillful dialogue and situational analysis tools such as the
left hand column exercise.9 Finally, these conditions and activities must be
institutionalized through structures and processes so that the learning is truly
organizational.
1.2 Methodology
Chapter two of this research examines the development of a computer-based
organizational learning initiative called the Book of Knowledge. Chapter three
investigates Tech Clubs, cross-platform teams that endeavor to share knowledge and
develop (some) common standards. These undertakings are contemplated as
organizational learning systems in terms of their abilities to institutionalize single-loop
learning and to stimulate double-loop learning. Chapter four examines hard-top door
design and implementation in the context of single-loop problem solving efforts including
designed experimentation. The fifth Chapter investigates hard-top door implementation
issues employing a Learning History, which contemplates related double-loop learning
efforts and the existence of learning impediments. The conclusions and recommendations
from the research are presented in Chapter six.
CHAPTER 2 - THE BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE
2.0 Introduction
With the advent of technology, many companies seek to enhance organizational
learning utilizing computer tools such as shareware and various electronic databases.
While the use of computer technology is a logical advance, many organizations find it
challenging to determine exactly how to optimize the use of technology such that single-
loop learnings are institutionalized and double-loop learning is developed within the
organization. A significant part of the challenge lies in determining the scope of the
project and the particular application. The applications can vary from the very broad to
more specific uses of technology. A major aluminum manufacturer is working to establish
a global communications network so that employees may share data around the world,
while a major auto manufacturer is developing process leadership homepages (accessed
via internal networks) that detail the benefits of various continuous improvement projects.
Each application described above represents a major allocation of time and resources, with
the broader, more ambiguous applications requiring a greater level of commitment for
successful implementation. The goal of each application is the same: to share significant
learning throughout the organization, with the intended benefits described in the first
chapter of this document.
In an effort to capitalize on computer technology and obtain the noted
organizational learning benefits, the PTO initiated development of the Manufacturing
Book of Knowledge (BoK). The BoK was broadly defined as a computer based tool to be
used by platform team members to share significant learning throughout the organization.
2.1 Methodology
The goal of this portion of the research was to assist in the planning and
development of the BoK, and to present recommendations for its continued development.
To accomplish this, the following methodology was employed: 1) development of initial
system specifications, and 2) prototype development and evaluation. Recommendations
for future development are presented in chapter six of this document.
The researcher was part of a team assembled to develop the BoK using the above
described methodology. The initial system specifications were developed using data from
platform management personnel who advocated development of the BoK. A nominal
group technique was employed at a meeting of the managers, where they were asked to
describe the ideal system and its attributes. This data was used to develop preliminary
system design requirements. Figure 1 shows the key elements of the BoK as defined by
the managers.
Book of Knowledge
1 I 1 I I I I
World Plant to Toyota Tech Trip Cont. Comp.
Class Mfg Plant Info. C ubs Rpts. Imp. Anly.
Launch Alum. CIW O/P
On-going Ass'y BoK sugg.
B-I-W
Weld'g
Stamp'g
Figure 1 - BoK key elements
Once preliminary design requirements were established, prototype development
began. The researcher was part of a lead-user team whose mission was to develop a beta
test version of the BoK for the lead-user group area. The team employed a rapid
prototype development process where actual computer screens (i.e. input / output
options) were designed in team meetings, and mock-ups were available for evaluation in
the next session. This initial phase of the BoK focused on best practices for the lead-user
area and was completed in a time-period shorter than the target of 90 days. Later phases
of the lead-user BoK were planned to cover other areas specified in the BoK design
requirements.
2.2 System Analysis
The key elements of the BoK align with a model of organizational learning systems as
defined by Nevis et al.10, shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 - Elements of an Organizational Learning system
The BoK's correlation to the first two elements of this model largely involve single-loop
learning efforts. In terms of the first element, acquisition of knowledge, the BoK's
benchmarking data is representative of performance gap assessment and the scanning
imperative. The continuous improvement information is an example of the experimental
mind-set presented in the model. The second element involves various modes of
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documentation and dissemination of the data. While some data may be developed through
informal or evolutionary modes, inherently the BoK forces a formal mode of
documentation and dissemination of data by virtue of its existence as a computer-based
tool. The final element of utilization characterized by learning focus corresponds to
double-loop learning, or the extent to which the organization tests its theories-in-use. The
general data structure of the BoK does not appear sufficient to incorporate this feature.
However, certain categories of information in the data structure and system requirements
expressed during the nominal group technique may lend themselves to stimulate double-
loop learning (D.L.L.). Figure 3 illustrates examples of this potential.
System requirement: Objective, analytical method to evaluate best
practices
D.LL Potential: Evaluation is conducted at the level of examining the
theories-in-use underlying the best practices and making appropriate
changes to the practices and theories
BoK Category: Things gone right and wrong (TGR/W)
D.LL Potential: Analysis and utilization of this information results in
changes to basic assumptions that influenced the things gone wrong.
Figure 3 - BoK Double-loop learning (D.L.L.) opportunities
2.3 Process Evaluation
In completing the lead user beta test version of the BoK, several global issues
became evident. First was the issue of ensuring that the BoK was a "living" document
rather than an encyclopedia or pure reference document. Because some of the resource
data for the BoK was historical, there was concern that the intended end-users might
neglect to reference the data on a regular basis - much as individuals tend to neglect use of
encyclopedias. This reinforced the requirement that the data in the BoK had to be useful
for individuals' in their routine responsibilities as well as in those occasions where a
historical reference is necessary. Because of the diversity and magnitude of intended end-
user groups, a great deal of time and effort would be necessary to meet this specification.
The resource allocation for such an effort became the second global issue.
The lead-user group was selected (in part) because of their level of preparation for
developing the BoK. This particular group had its "best practices" defined, which
facilitated incorporation into the prototype. There was also an underlying assumption by
this group that "best" practice was a relative term, and they sought to design a feedback
system in order to revise or update their best practices as necessary. This represented an
effort to institutionalize single-loop learning, as the group did not seek to explore the
theories-in-use behind the best practices in this example. However, the potential for
stimulation of double-loop learning from these practices exists as discussed in the previous
section.
Other areas of the organization did not have best practices defined, and would
need to spend a great deal of time establishing those practices for incorporation into the
BoK. The lower level of preparation caused a dilemma relative to the development of the
BoK: who would be responsible for establishing the best practices and incorporating this
data into the BoK? The magnitude of the task could require a "librarian" to organize and
update data in the BoK. However if responsibility for data input and update was taken
away from the end-users, then the BoK might be treated as an encyclopedia because the
end-users can become detached from the system.
The issues of resource allocation and overall preparedness for implementation of
the BoK were directed to platform management. At this point in the research, the phase
two beta prototype has been postponed, and the scope of the project is being re-evaluated.
2.4 Conclusion
As the analysis demonstrated, the BoK is an organizational learning system whose
key elements primarily work to institutionalize single-loop learning. As discussed in the
process evaluation, many parts of the organization are unprepared to offer data for the
knowledge acquisition phase. Because this represents a project of extremely broad scope,
a good deal of effort will be required to facilitate the institutionalization of single-loop
learnings from the entire organization.
Interaction with the advocates of the BoK indicated a desire to stimulate double-
loop learning. However, as the framework suggests, this type of learning is heavily
dependent on dialogue and other forms of interaction to observe and explore the actual
theories-in-use. In this regard the human element is inextricable from the process.
Organizational defensive routines and inhibitory loops are detected via observation of
behaviors which at this point can not be fully ascertained with the use of computerized
learning systems. Therefore, what the BoK can contribute to the pursuit of double-loop
learning is the presentation of valid information to support the dialogue process for
exploration of the theories-in-use underlying its contents.
CHAPTER 3 - TECH CLUBS
3.0 Introduction
One of the biggest challenges for a platform team organization is to transfer
technical knowledge across the different platforms, so that expertise and superior practices
are shared within the company. Such sharing accelerates single-loop learning throughout
the organization and avoids error repetition. To encourage this sharing of knowledge the
platform team organization formed a number of Tech Clubs - cross platform groups
organized according to function or technical expertise. The manufacturing based Tech
Clubs are related to:
* Aluminum
* Assembly
* Body-in-White
* Controls, Architecture & Robotics
* Dimensional control
* Technical systems
* Welding
* Stamping
Each club is led by the executive of a particular platform and meeting attendance, although
encouraged, is on a voluntary basis. The clubs meet regularly, with meeting frequencies
varying from once a month to once a quarter. The ultimate goal of the Tech Clubs is to
help keep the platforms informed of each other's activities, discuss new technologies or
process improvements, and to facilitate communication and sharing of knowledge by
building relationships between its members. In light of the personal interaction and
relationship building potential, Tech Clubs could become forums for stimulating double-
loop learning. Figure 4 details the original (1991) charter for the Tech Clubs.
CHARTER
Develop objectives by Platform and model, exhibiting continuous
improvement; focus on investment, lead time, flexibility, ergonomics,
variable cost / productivity and specific technology where applicable
* Communicate current level of Technology and future plans by
platform
* Review existing technologies that are capable of meeting objectives
and make recommendations
* Recommends standards revisions where necessary
* Identify recommended suppliers with which to work
* Develop investment and timing plans to support recommendations
* Develop process / product design recommendations for future
products
* Communicate with engineering Tech Clubs
Figure 4 - Tech Club Charter
Each tech club adopted the charter verbatim as a mission statement, or used the charter to
develop more specific objectives for the club.
Formation of technically based clubs for sharing purposes is not limited to platform
team organizations. Many decentralized organizations or those with distinct product
group centers have also attempted to benefit from technical sharing groups. For the last
decade, a major aircraft manufacturer has held technical forums which meet biannually to
work towards a mission similar to that of the tech clubs. The meetings last for several
days and include personnel from each division of the corporation. While the benefits of
these meetings have not always been financially quantifiable, tangible benefits have been
noted. Most significantly, the forum members developed common specifications for a
particular type of capital intensive equipment that each division had previously specified
separately. They were able to approach the vendor as a unified group, and to obtain the
equipment at lower cost based on their common specifications. As such tangible benefits
are experienced within organizations, the formation of technically based clubs should
increase.
3.1 Research plan
This research attempts to investigate the overall effectiveness of the Tech Clubs as
organizational learning systems based on their success in encouraging communication
among the club members and across platform teams. In order to do so, the following
research hypothesis was formed:
Clubs with explicit objectives and which meet regularly will show a higher
communication index than those with no explicit objectives (i.e. less
specific) and that have less frequent meetings.
Explicit objectives are defined in terms of goals or assignments for accomplishment by
year-end.
To evaluate the hypothesis, Tech Club objectives were reviewed and club members
were randomly surveyed to determine their communication patterns. The survey was
conducted following an experiment devised from Foundations of Behavioral Research by
Kerlinger. This particular experimental design was chosen to compensate for the
researcher 's phenomenon that often occurs during surveys: participants will respond
affirmatively to questions simply because they are being asked - regardless of the validity
of the statement. This phenomenon is analogous to espoused values conflicting with the
actual theory-in-use. The design does not question the integrity of the participants, but
helps ensure conclusive results by calling attention to the aforementioned phenomenon if it
occurs. The experimental design is shown in Figure 5.
Four group form - Experimental and Control
Yb X Ya Experimental
Yb (-X) Ya Control 1
Mr X Ya Control 2 (Exp. 2)
(~X) Ya Control 3
Key:
Yb = observations before intervention
Ya = observations after intervention
X = intervention -X = no intervention
Figure 5 - Experimental design
The groups were matched (hence the MK) inherently because the study involved specific
tech clubs. In addition, the meeting frequency influenced which groups were experimental
and which were control; to facilitate the intervention, only clubs that met more often than
quarterly were considered for the experimental group. From the candidate clubs, the final
designation for the four survey groups was randomly assigned. The observations were
made over a nine week period, and the intervention started in week six. The intervention
consisted of attending a Tech Club meeting to become familiar with personnel, and asking
additional questions in the survey related to Tech Club meeting attendance and perceived
objectives for the club. The detailed survey research plan is contained in Appendix A.
3.2 Research Results
3.2.1 Tech Club Objectives
Most of the Tech Clubs investigated in the research used the original charter to
develop a mission statement or objectives specific to the club. However, the depth and
content of these articles varied greatly. This section will examine the explicit objectives of
the clubs.
The experimental group goals are documented in a one page summary sheet, and
are very similar to the general Tech Club charter. Overall, the goals are broad: to share
cross platform information, new process technology, tooling and equipment issues, and to
support specific cross platform work teams (e.g. teams formed by the company to
optimize resource allocation such as ergonomics). The Tech Club's goals are established
at the beginning of each year, and revised as necessary by the membership. The one page
summary also establishes the meeting schedule for the year and notes membership for the
year - implying that each platform may send different representatives each year.
Interestingly, membership and participation issues are documented on the summary sheet
as follows:
"Participants till view this activity as an optional / non-essential task.
Participants are unwilling and / or not able to accept work assignments
from the Tech Club. Representatives do not have (specific) information to
share. Comments are often based on opinions, rather than
measurements."
It is probable that this documentation of issues along with the yearly goals is the result of
efforts by the participating members to solicit additional participation in the club. I
interacted several times with this particular club, and found that participation generally
consisted of members from the same platform as the Tech Club leader (e.g. their platform
executive). This pattern was not evident in the two other clubs that I interacted with; later
sections of this chapter will discuss the issue of participation in greater detail.
The first control group had a mission statement summarized as three key activities:
developing a business plan for (specific) production applications, acting as a focal team for
knowledge and expertise, and proposing production applications as necessary for an area
of interest. As can be ascertained, this particular Tech Club is concerned with an
application and technology that is relatively new to the company, hence the goals of
establishing the plan and proposing applications. In addition, a one page action plan was
developed to support the mission and sub-groups were formed to address four major areas
of concern for the club.
The second control group had the most extensively defined objectives of all the
experimental groups. The mission is summarized as sharing cross platform process and
tooling information, investigating new technology, updating standards and developing
cross platform training programs. In order to support the mission this club established a
detailed prioritized list of work requirements related to each area of the mission statement,
as well as process improvements, maintenance, supplier participation and cross platform
technology teams.
The final control group produced no mission statement or objectives other than the
original charter for the Tech Clubs. This was the only group where I did not attend a
meeting either before or after the survey period.
3.2.2 Communication patterns
During the survey period more than 130 observations were made concerning
communication patterns in the tech clubs. In general, communication indices were low for
each of the clubs surveyed. The indices were calculated according to equation 1 detailed
in the research plan in Appendix A, and represent the level of intragroup communication in
the Tech Clubs. While communication was low between members of the clubs, the data in
table 1 show that the specific Tech Club topic (i.e. welding) is being regularly discussed by
club members. The discussion typically occurs with individuals in the same platform team
who are not members of the Tech Club. This pattern of communication with individuals in
close proximity is repeated in the data related to general technical conversations held
during the day. This correlates to Allen's 11 research on communication and distance
which showed that the probability of two people talking in an office increases significantly
only when they are seated less than 30 feet apart. This notion reinforces the importance of
attendance at Tech Club meetings as a stimulus for conversation.
Experimtl Experimtl' Control 1 Control 2'" Control 3
No. of participants 18 15b  15 20 18
Communic. indexi 0.013 0.010 0.029 0 0.007
Discussed topic 72% 80% 67% 65% 89%
*w/pltfm co-worker 62% 67% 60% 77% 75%
Technical discussion 56% 33% 100% 65% 39%
*w/pltfm co-worker 50% 80% 73% 92% 71%
Notes - a: prime denotes observations after intervention (e.g. Control 2')
b: Three of the original participants were unavailable for observations after the intervention
c: Communication index calculated using equation I (see Appendix A)
Table 1 - Summary: Survey data
The original research hypothesis was disproved because none of the Tech Clubs had a high
communication index, and the club with the most explicit objectives and regular meetings
(Control 2) had the lowest intragroup communication index (zero). It is interesting to
note that the club with the highest communication index (Control 1), involves technology
that is most unfamiliar to the industry. While the difference is not extreme (i.e. none of
the clubs had a high index), this finding is generally consistent with that of Clark and
Fujimoto which concludes that rapidly changing industries exhibit higher communication
between groups. The newer technologies investigated in the Control 2 tech club represent
greater potential change for the industry than the technologies of the other clubs, so there
is more communication between the Control 2 tech club members. Accordingly Control
1, in spite of its explicit objectives, represents one of the more familiar technologies of the
industry and correspondingly has a low communication index.
As the findings between groups before and after the intervention are fairly
consistent, the researcher's phenomenon described in Section 3.1 does not appear to have
been a factor in this experiment.
3.2.3 Observations from the Intervention
During the intervention tech club members were questioned concerning their
meeting attendance habits, relationship with other tech club members and the overall
objective of the tech club. This section presents key observations related to those topics.
3. 2.3. 1 - Meeting Attendance
While some of the participants reported regular attendance of tech club meetings,
approximately half of the survey respondents reported infrequent attendance of meetings.
There were three main reasons given for the lack of participation in the tech club: 1)
launch activities, 2) disincentives for attendance and 3) movement to unrelated areas.
Approximately 55% of the infrequent participants cited launch activities as the
primary reason for their lack of tech club meeting attendance. These respondents reported
absences from the tech clubs ranging from 6 to 24 months because of higher priority
launch activities. The theory-in-use was that tech club activities were secondary to launch.
Since none of the respondents reported the assignment of alternative tech club
representatives to fill in for them while launch activities occurred, the theory-in-use is
supported with secondary observational data.
Roughly 35% of the infrequent participants cited reasons which correspond to
disincentives for attendance at tech club meetings. Generally these respondents said that
they were either too busy to attend the meetings (general responsibilities - not launch
related), or that the meeting time and / or location was inconvenient. There was a theory-
in-use that the aforementioned issues were valid reasons for discontinued participation in
the tech club, and the respondents expressed no fear of reprisal for their lack of
participation. These factors combined are disincentives for attendance at tech club
meetings.
The final portion of respondents reported that they did not participate in tech club
activities because they had moved to new areas and had responsibilities which were
unrelated to the particular club. They expressed some frustration because they seemed to
be on outdated tech club mailing lists. However, none of these respondents had
mentioned their inactive status during the survey until they were specifically asked about
their meeting attendance habits during the intervention. One implication of this behavior is
that the respondents assume a sort of "life membership" in the tech clubs. Another
potential implication is that the responses of these participants could have produced
artificially low communication indices because of their inactivity in the tech club(s).
However, the small number of respondents involved (an average of one per club) would
not have biased the indices to any great extent. In addition, their responses could be
indicative of the strength of relationships formed within the tech clubs, whether "life"
membership produced continued communication among members.
3.2.3.2 - Relationships between tech club members
When asked to specifically identify tech club members with whom they consult on
a regular basis (i.e. weekly), approximately 50% of the intervention participants reported
that they communicated most often with those members who are part of the same platform
team. Only 25% reported regular communication with tech club members from different
platforms. In most of these cases the respondents consulted with specific colleagues from
different platforms who, because of their previously demonstrated expertise, are
recognized as technical "gatekeepers" within the organization. This finding is consistent
with Utterback and Taylor's' 2 research which suggests that individuals with key technical
communication roles prior to some organizational change re-emerge as gatekeepers in the
changed groups. The final 25% of the respondents reported no regular communication
with tech club members. It is the researcher's opinion that the number of respondents
reporting weekly communication with other tech club members may be biased by the
researcher's phenomenon because such frequent communication between club members
should have been manifested in higher intragroup communication indices. It is likely that
the respondents consult with their peers as noted, except on a less frequent basis than
weekly. However, in agreement with earlier data it is likely that the relative proportion of
responses is accurate in that most participants confer with colleagues within their platform
team as opposed to those in different platform teams.
3.2.3.3 - Objective of the Tech Clubs
A majority of the intervention participants responded that a fundamental objective
of the tech clubs is to share information between platforms, particularly relative to new
technology. Most expressed belief that this objective was generally being met. However a
large portion of these participants said that the other fundamental objective of the tech
clubs was to develop standards for cross platform adherence. These respondents
expressed frustration that the clubs were not meeting the standards-related objective.
Most stated that the clubs lack the formal authority necessary to enforce standards, but
offered no explanation as to why they believe that the development of standards has not
been a priority for the tech clubs.
3.3 Conclusion
In terms of encouraging communication among tech club members and across
platforms, data indicate that the tech clubs have not been as successful as the platform
team organization would expect. In discussions with tech club members, some expressed
frustration that attending the meetings did not add value to their work-day. Because of
this perception, these members did not fully participate in the tech clubs and the low level
of communication in the clubs was exacerbated. This is an example of an inhibitory loop
as described in the framework. Data from the surveys and intervention indicate several
root causes for the perceived low added value of the tech clubs. These root causes are
pictorially represented in Figure 6.
Low communication
Low participation
Disincentives Low value added
Optional participation Unmet objectives )
Higher priority work Lack of authority
Figure 6 - Communication inhibitory loop
The Tech Clubs are operating in a culture where launch responsibilities supersede all other
responsibilities, and Tech Club representation in this case in non-essential. This
assessment of non-essentiality is supported by intervention observations of the
disincentives for participation. In order for the tech clubs to meet their objectives, these
root cause issues must be addressed. Specific recommendations are presented in chapter
six of this research. Additionally, the example of a successful implementation of Tech
Clubs cited in the introduction to this chapter may be examined for applicable strategies.
The tangible benefits noted are important for the continued support and success of
technical forums within the organization; they encourage both participation by members
and support by management. In light of the accomplishments, participation in the forums
is considered a priority and an honor.
As previously stated, Tech Clubs provide potential forums for double-loop
learning. As an example, the development of standards provides opportunity to begin
dialogue which examines the underlying assumptions of the standards. This could result in
a change of these assumptions (or new theories-in-use) and the development of a new
standard. However, the cultural conditions must exist to stimulate and support such
dialogue. A challenge then for a PTO desiring to use Tech Clubs as forums for double-
loop learning is to create an environment within the clubs and in the larger organization
which promotes double-loop learning.
CHAPTER 4 - DOOR EXPERIMENTATION
4.0 Introduction
The preceding chapters have examined organizational learning in the context of
specific enhancement initiatives. While this analysis is important, it is equally important to
examine learning in the context of customary work completion within the organization.
To accomplish this, the research will now focus on the specific example of hard-top door
development.
4.0.1 Background
Historically, small cars were not profitable for US automakers but all produced
various small car models because such models provide a strategic market entry point. In
their effort to become the leading automaker in the world, the PTO endeavored to make a
profitable small car - referenced in this research as the case study vehicle. In order to
make the case study vehicle profitable, aggressive cost and weight targets were
established. As one enabler to reach these goals, the decision was made to use a hard-top
door design.
Traditional, or full-frame, vehicle doors consist of interior and exterior panels
which connect to form the rectangular box or foundation of the door, and a header
assembly which serves as the housing for the door glass. A hard-top door consists only of
the rectangular box; there is no header assembly. The door glass fits directly into the car
aperture, with weather-strip materials providing a seal for the glass. Figure 7 shows a full-
framed door and a hard-top door design.
(a) (b)
Figure 7 - (a) Full-frame door (b) Hard-top door
Because a hard-top door consists of less material, substantial cost and weight savings were
expected for the case study vehicle. In addition the hard-top design was selected because
it provides a distinct styling benefit for small cars, the "greenhouse effect". The lack of a
header makes a larger glass section visible in the door and as a result the interior of the car
seems to have more room.
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4.0.2. Implementation issues
For ergonomic and efficiency considerations the plant uses a "doors-off' assembly
process, described below.
Doors-off Assembly Process
Body Shop:
* doors are attached (set) to the vehicle
* doors are adjustedfor fit
Paint Shop:
* vehicle is painted
Door Assembly:
* doors are removed
* door hardware (i.e. window mechanism, etc.) installed on
separate assembly line
Final Assembly:
* fully trimmed doors re-attached to vehicle
* doors adjusted to ensure proper (final) fit
As indicated above, the doors are adjusted in two areas to ensure proper fit. The doors
are fit in the body shop to ensure proper coverage during the paint process. The final
assembly fitting ensures that door gaps are evenly spaced. Fitting is typically
accomplished by assembly personnel, or "door fitters", hammering the door hinge area and
then physically pulling the door into place. This fitting process is employed to some
degree in most automotive assembly plants. While the process may seem unrefined, door
fitters are traditionally among the most skilled assembly personnel because of the potential
for damage or poor fit because of the process.
When the case study vehicle went into production the plant had problems with
excessive door sag, where the door hardware weight caused the door assembly to deflect
or sag below its optimal position in the door opening. Potential contributing sources for
door sag are summarized in figure 8.
Figure 8 - Door sag contributing factors
The mechanical and material properties of the door panels, hinges and vehicle aperture
influence stiffness and subsequent resistance to sag. Process factors which can influence
sag include the variability introduced from personnel, equipment, and the body shop door
fitting process. Additionally, the paint process may contribute to sag by influencing the
door set position. When vehicles are painted the doors are held closed with a temporary
fixture (slave) because the permanent door closure system is not yet installed. Variability
in the position of the door slaves as vehicles go through the paint baking cycle may
influence sag by altering the body shop door set position. Although most people agree
that the factors listed in figure 8 are likely to influence sag, the exact contribution from
each of these factors remains uncertain.
Most doors experience a small amount of sag which is typically compensated for in
the door setting process. In plants benchmarked for excellence in door assembly, the
doors are set 0.5 - 1.0 mm above level to compensate for sag. For the case study vehicle,
the doors had to be set 4.0 mm high to compensate for sag. The practice of setting the
doors high was problematic because the assembly plant workers experienced difficulty in
repeatably setting the doors at 4mm. The high setting caused the door character lines to
be misaligned, and fitters were no longer able to visually evaluate the proper fit of a door.
These factors increased the variation of the door setting process with potential negative
influence to the variation of subsequent downstream door assembly processes. Increased
variation in the system caused increased effort to ensure proper door fit in the final
assembly operations, which negatively affected the efficiency of the assembly line.
4.0.3 Potential quality issues
Door sag can ultimately contribute to aesthetic problems such as uneven gaps or a
lack of flushness between door panels. Additionally, poor panel fits resulting from door
sag can contribute to mechanical problems such as wind noise, water leakage and
increased door closing effort. Earlier PTO vehicles employing a hard-top door design had
experienced greater incidences of wind noise and water leakage as reported by customers.
The case study vehicle ratings for both of these warranty areas were higher than the
industry average in the JD Powers initial quality survey'3, and higher than those of other
vehicles manufactured by the PTO.
The assembly plant difficulties and potential quality issues made resolution of the
excessive door sag problem a high priority.
4.1 Major contributor: hinge desien
In order to understand the issue, doors from cars with similar hard-top designs
were evaluated for sag. Over a range of loads the case study vehicle generally exhibited
more sag than the other cars in the study. During the evaluation it was noted that the door
hinges of the other cars had more structure than those on the case study vehicle, even
though the vehicle doors were of comparable size and weight. The distinctive styling of
the case study vehicle door required close clearances in the area of the hinge, which had
resulted in a more compact hinge design. This compact hinge was considered adequate
for the case study vehicle, as the same design was used on other cars in the PTO.
However, the observations from the study led to further testing and analysis to attempt to
quantify the effect of the hinge on door sag.
The total hinge contribution to sag was estimated by isolating the sag contributions
from other product factors and eliminating the process factor contributions. To
accomplish this, laboratory tests were conducted for three load conditions:
* Sag due to sheet metal weight
* Sag due to sheet metal and door hardware weight (fully trimmed)
* Sag with fully trimmed door and graduated loading to corporate
standard
The doors were supported by hydraulic jack, fitted with an electronic deflection transducer
and then mounted to a rigid pillar at a predetermined open position. A zero deflection
data point was recorded, the jack was removed and the door was allowed to sag. After
the deflection was recorded, the door was returned to zero and the process was repeated
for the load conditions described above. Next the entire process was completed for doors
with rigid hinges. Finally, the relative contribution of the hinge was extrapolated through
application of the theory of superposition. From this analysis, the hinge contribution to
door sag was estimated at 70%. This value was confirmed through similar tests
conducted in the assembly plant.
Subsequent finite element analysis of the hinge showed an area of extremely high
stresses which could contribute to excessive deflection. A hinge was modified to
strengthen the suspect area, and a door with the modified hinge was tested for sag as
described above. This particular door showed a marked improvement in total sag, with
the hinge contribution substantially lowered from 70% to approximately 12%.
As a result of the investigation, a decision was made to redesign the hinge. The
modification made for the laboratory tests was not feasible for production use because it
exceeded the available clearance in the hinge area. Because of tooling lead times and
other coordination issues, the hinge redesign was slated for the next major style revision of
the case study vehicle. The hinge vendor, engineering and manufacturing personnel are
collaborating to incorporate design changes which will strengthen the suspect area and
reduce the contribution of the hinge to door sag.
4.2 Experimentation: extra welds
4.2.0 Background
Because the next major vehicle style revision was approximately three years away,
an interim solution was sought to help alleviate the issues at the assembly plant. After
process engineers from the Mexican plant (which assembled the same product) noted that
the door sag problem seemed to be less apparent there, the platform team began to
evaluate differences between the door assembly processes of the two plants in an effort to
find an explanation for the perceived difference. The assessment concluded that the
Mexican plant used a different weld pattern, with 10 additional welds, for the hinge pillar
which could conceivably increase the stiffness of the member and help reduce door sag.
The hinge pillar with the additional welds is shown in figure 9.
Figure 9 - Hinge pillar welds
The US assembly plant was unable to incorporate all of the extra welds into the hinge
pillar without significantly increasing the cycle time of the robotic welding station.
Additionally, analysis of the placement of the extra welds indicated that as many as half
were in positions which would not significantly add to the stiffness of the member. Due to
these factors and because five welds could be added without detrimental effects to the
welding station cycle time, a decision was made to evaluate the effects of five extra welds
on the hinge pillar.
4.2.1 Designed experimentation
In an effort to quantify the effect of the extra welds on door sag values, a designed
experiment was conducted at the plant. Because the contribution of the assembly process
to the level of door sag is unknown, the original designed experiment included a factor to
help evaluate the process contribution. However, due to production constraints, the
process factor was not included in the actual experiment. The experiment was
subsequently a single factor design with two levels of treatment: doors with the standard
hinge pillar weld pattern vs. doors with the standard pattern plus the addition of the five
extra welds.
Because the additional welds necessitated reprogramming the welding robot, the
door groups were run in single batches to minimize production interference. Door gap
measures were taken in the body shop (after the initial door installation), and on the final
assembly line (after the doors were re-installed on the car). Door sag values were
calculated by subtracting the values of measurement point 5 (shown in figure 10) in the
body shop and assembly areas.
Sag = Point 5 (body shop) - Point 5 (assembly)
Kentucky windage = Point 5 (body shop) - Point 4 (body shop)
Note: this is door set position
Figure 10 - Door measurement points
In addition to sag values the "Kentucky windage", or the door set position, was calculated
by subtracting the values of measurement points 5 and 4 in the body shop. The Kentucky
windage value reflects the ability of operating personnel to repeatably set the doors at the
target of 4 mm high. Operating personnel were instructed to set the doors as normal
during the experiment. Table 2 below summarizes the results of the door weld
experiment.
No Additional Welds 5 Extra Welds
Sample size 69 44
Average Sag' (mm) 3.33 3.00
Std. Deviation (sag) 0.75 0.68
Average windage2 (mm) 3.80 4.05
Std. Deviation (windage) 0.47 0.55
Table 2 - Experiment results summary
Testing of the data indicated that the average sag values of the sample groups were
statistically different. The data was tested for normality using Bartlett's test; once
confirmed T-tests were run to validate the statistical significance of the results. Statistical
results are found in Appendix B. The practical benefit of the difference in average sag
values is questionable when the sources of error of the process and experiment are
considered. The 0.33 mm difference in average sag values is close to the limits of
precision for the door setting fixture. In addition, because only one factor (welds) was
tested it is not possible to give a comprehensive answer on the true difference in sag
values because of the lack of process variable input. As discussed in the introduction to
this section, an expanded designed experiment would need to be run in order to give such
an answer. The original design called for the Kentucky windage to be varied as part of the
experiment. Although windage was not varied as a factor in the experiment, it was
calculated as indicated in the above table. This was done because of the potential for
interaction between the windage and door sag. Preliminary graphical analysis (see figures
11, 12) indicates that the interaction may exist.
Figure 11: run charts
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Figure 12 - XY charts
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The run and XY plots show a potential interaction that may be lessened with the addition
of the five extra welds. The run plots overlap for the samples without the extra welds
while sag is consistently lower than the windage with the extra welds. The XY plots do
not show a linear pattern (i.e. a direct interactive relationship) but the relative spatial
displacement of the data-points confirm the bias for lower sag values than windage for
cars with the extra welds. While this analysis is grossly approximated and would require
further experimentation for validation, it supports previous laboratory testing that also
indicated an interaction between windage and sag. The extra welds appeared to lessen the
intensity of this interaction, even though the practical difference of the average sag values
of the two sample populations is questionable. These findings imply that quantifying and
reducing the process contribution to door sag may be the next logical effort for interim
resolution of the issue.
4.3 Potential sag issues with aluminum doors
As automakers seek to improve fuel efficiency and recyclability, aluminum is being
used increasingly as the material of choice for vehicles. The vehicle examined in this case
study has had limited production as an aluminum intensive vehicle, where all of the major
body panels and structural members were made of aluminum. As the probability of
production of aluminum intensive vehicles increases, the issue of door sag becomes more
significant. As noted earlier, the low weight of the door panel structure relative to door
hardware weight was a contributing factor to the door sag issue. Additionally, as vehicles
incorporate more features the door hardware weight will continue to increase. In
consideration of these issues, a lighter weight aluminum door can potentially experience
more sag due to the difference in material moduli between aluminum and steel.
4.4 Conclusion
One of the most important outcomes of the root cause analysis was the renewed
collaborative approach adopted by the personnel involved, and the resulting change to the
hinge design. This resolution represents the institutionalization (across the vehicle
platform) of a single-loop learning process for the case study vehicle door. issues.
The door weld experimentation served as an empirical means to enhance
organizational learning in two ways: 1) it provided data to help quantify the effects of a
process change for which the results might not have been as well documented elsewise and
2) it helped reinforce the notion of designed experimentation as a means for process
measurement. These effects are important at both engineering and manufacturing levels.
The experimentation served as a feedback mechanism between engineering
recommendations (e.g. the additional welds) and manufacturing outcomes (e.g. quantified
effect on door sag). This provided the mechanism for single-loop learning to occur in
terms of quantifying the effects of the extra welds on door sag.
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CHAPTER 5 - DOOR ISSUES: LEARNING HISTORY
5.0 Introduction
In considering the issues surrounding hard-top door implementation the PTO is
challenged to internalize these issues, examine the underlying assumptions and
institutionalize the learning such that problems do not reoccur in future projects. To assist
with this goal, a learning history was created to answer the question "what went wrong
for the hard-top door implementation?" with specific attention to the issue of door sag.
The goal for the learning history in single-loop context is to document significant learning
related to hard-top door design and implementation, and to assist with the transfer of this
knowledge across the corporation. The goal in double-loop context is to disseminate the
document in order to stimulate dialogue which examines and restructures the theories-in-
use that allowed the problem to propagate.
The learning history technique was developed by the MIT Organizational Learning
Center (MIT-OLC). The learning history document is a combination of exposition and
analysis written by the author(s) and a "jointly told tale" of the event narrated in the voice
of the participants in the learning initiative. However, the quotes are anonymous in order
to allow focus on the issue at hand rather than the participant. In addition to describing
the facts and events of what occurred in the initiative, the history focuses on what the
participants thought about the events, and how they perceived their own actions and the
actions of others. This recreation of the experience of "being there" helps the reader
understand what happened and presents perspectives that are not always discussed in
typical business settings. It is this open evaluation and discussion of the situation that
allow the organization to overcome defensive routines that have traditionally discouraged
learning by making the true issues undiscussable. Dissemination of the learning history
via team enhancement workshops is crucial to encourage development of organizational
skills and the culture necessary for double loop learning.
5.1 Learning History Methodoloev
To create the learning history, interviews were held with key personnel involved in
the learning initiative to record their perspectives of both the successes and shortcomings
of the project, focusing on implementation issues. These perspectives were subsequently
compiled and analyzed for recurring themes that represented pivotal issues for the group.
The themes became the foundation for the learning history. Figure 13, below, details the
learning history development process employed by the author.
Figure 13 - Learning History development process overview
For the purpose of analysis, only the major themes and findings will be discussed in this
chapter.. The learning history in its entirety is included in Appendix C.
5.2 Dominant Theme: Teamwork
Less than optimal team performance is an issue that all organizations contend with
to varying degrees. In a platform team environment, effective team performance is not
only desirable, but is mandatory for the survival of the organization. As teams are
composed of individuals with a variety of backgrounds and experiences, the platform team
organization must overcome individual and collective issues of diversity to create the high
performance teams required in the organization.
A major factor contributing to the problem of door sag was the apparent lack of
teamwork in resolving the issue. Perceived barriers between groups within the door
systems team has inhibited effective communication and negatively affected teamwork.
Differences in education level, experience and functional alliances were but a few of the
barriers that the team had to overcome to build more effective communication and
teamwork.
From analysis of the learning history interviews, the lack of teamwork for
resolution of the door sag problem followed a negatively reinforcing cycle, and became an
inhibitory loop. Because communication of the issues between groups was not successful,
the problem was investigated on a sporadic and individual basis. As the problem
continued to remain unsolved, frustration and animosity built between the parties involved.
The ultimate effect was strained working relations and ineffective teamwork for resolution
of the door issues. This cycle is depicted below in Figure 14.
Ineffe
Unsuccessful communication
Fragmented problem solving
Problem continues unresolved
-,ctive teamwork Frustration and animosity build
Strained working relationships
Figure 14 -Inhibitory loop
The cycle began with ineffective communication of the issues involved. Numerous factors
influenced and contributed to this lack of communication. Aside from issues of diversity
which can inherently make effective working relationships more challenging to build, the
nature of the issues being discussed profoundly influenced the lack of communication.
Because the communication involved a problem which was potentially embarrassing to the
individual contributors, organizational defensive routines activated and hindered
communication of the true issues. As Argyris proposes in Overcoming Organizational
Defenses, the common reaction to defensive routines is a sense of helplessness, which
migrates to cynicism and blaming others in the organization for the problems that have
arisen. This reactionary loop, or organizational defensive routine, is depicted in figure 15.
Defensive
reaction
Blame ) Helplessnes
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Figure 15 - Organizational defensive routine
The phenomenon is clearly operational as evidenced in the following excerpts from the
learning history:
Engineering - person C
I think we were all talking and trying to do the same thing, but the
defense mechanisms go in at a certain point. And this is all human
nature. You're proud of what you did and someone points a finger
and says that it could be done better; you dig your heels in and say -
- "It's right. We've proved it."...
Manufacturing - person D
It went in one ear and out the other. I mean, I guess they
understood my concern, but they didn't do anything about it. ...We
couldn't begin to tell them how to change the design to improve it.
...When we did try they said "it's too expensive, too late, etc.". So
we just gave up.
Manufacturing - person F
I tried to communicate to my cohorts at the research center about
the problems we were having in the plant. They seemed
cooperative -- wanting to listen. I see that we "listened" but we
didn't do anything about it ... we still have the same problems we
had when we started.
Manufacturing - person B
It seemed that there was a lot of mud slinging going on between the
Product people and all of Manufacturing, at the research center and
the plant. ... There were some nasty notes generated that pinpointed
the whole problem on process ... I know I've told people that their
product was poor which was (I guess in the way that I conveyed
my message) mudslinging ... it just seemed that we really didn't
work together on this problem as a team.
From a systems perspective, numerous other issues identified in the learning history
influenced the eventual lack of teamwork in resolving the door problems. These issues
will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
5.3 Ancillary themes
A significant reason why the door sag problem was not resolved quickly related to
the complexity of the problem. Its root cause was tangled in the interdependencies of the
door system and the assembly process as discussed in the previous chapter. Solving such
a compound and somewhat ambiguous problem required a high level of teamwork,
analytical skills, time and effort. Additionally, previous experience and learnings about
hard-top door design had not been well documented or disseminated. The learning curve
associated with hard-top door implementation and the relative inexperience of some
personnel encumbered the problem solving effort for door sag.
As Senge wrote in The Fifth Discipline, "today's problems come from yesterday's
solutions" and "cause and effect are not closely related in time and space". These epithets
were true for the door sag problem. Some of the actions completed to make the door as
light-weight and as low cost as possible had adverse affects on the manufacturability of the
door. Indeed, a significant factor in the door issues was rigid and sometimes conflicting
objectives for the vehicle program. The platform sought to develop a profitable small car,
which had been unheard of for North American automakers in recent years. In order to
meet this goal, calculated risks were taken to make the car as lightweight and low cost as
possible. The hard-top door design was implemented for its styling and weight benefit,
but with the known risk of related wind-noise and water-leak issues. These warranty
issues are a by product of improper door fit and glass sealing / adjustment - all of which
can be linked to door sag and fit issues in the assembly plant.
Just as ineffective teamwork can hinder problem solving efforts, rigid or
conflicting objectives may foster "territorial" behaviors and activate organizational
defensive routines that subsequently impede problem resolution. This happens when rigid
objectives discourage a systems approach to problem solving, and instead individuals
territorially protect their own interests of meeting the goals rather than pursue the best
systemic solution for the problem. These ancillary themes are demonstrated in the
following learning history excerpts.
Manufacturing - person B
It seems that we were limited in budget, and they wanted to make this a
real lightweight car. Trying to achieve those goals, they maybe put the
other objectives to the wayside, or they weren't really concentrating on
making the door robust.
Engineering - person E
We were immersed in a situation that mandated that we design a small car
to meet very aggressive functional, cost, weight and investment targets.
After it was demonstrated how much we didn't spend, in the last 6-8
months before launch, management said 'okay spend some money to make
it even better'. By then the structure was set and the additional money that
was spent did not achieve the level of results that could have been
accomplished if these dollars were available earlier in the program.
Engineering - person E
... I think that if someone had foreseen the problems that we were going to
have then maybe we would have gone through some panic phase to change
the door. But other areas would have been affected like the aperture. If
we had changed the door we would have had to do some really difficult
things with the rest of the car.
Manufacturing -person D
We saw early on that there were going to be problems. But sometimes I
guess it's easier to take the excuse than to pursue the solution that you
know is not easy. I think what happened was that we didn't have people
that could come up with solutions to the problem that was identified. That
was probably due to general inexperience and perhaps a lack of cross-
functional experience.
The interaction of the dominant and ancillary themes can be summarized by the relational
diagram shown in figure 16.
Lack of focus
Ine
cation
onships
Process d
Product design
Figure 16 - Relational diagram
The themes and influence factors identified above were propagated due to the operation of
learning impediments in the larger organizational culture. The root issues were, in some
respects, undiscussable because of potential embarrassment for personnel involved. This
assessment of the organizational culture is supported by the following analysis that
employs Schein's model for assessing the levels of culture as presented in Organizational
Culture and Leadership.
5.4 Cultural Analysis
In the data collection process for the learning history, behaviors were observed
which implied some incongruity between the organization's espoused values and theories-
in-use. These incongruities formed the basis of the learning impediments referenced
above. The observations are analyzed in light of the artifacts presented, values espoused
and basic shared assumptions constructed from the behavior.
5.4.1 Artifacts
Thirteen people were interviewed for the learning history. Most were extremely
candid even though they were being taped. During the interviews people spoke of poor
working relationships within the group and a tendency to avoid addressing problems in
certain areas. After the interviews were transcribed and quotes were edited, everyone had
the opportunity to view their specific quotes which had been selected for inclusion in the
Learning History and to revise them as necessary. An interesting phenomena occurred:
the non-management people made only a few very minor revisions, while the managers
deleted or extensively revised entire sections of their quotes. Most expressed alarm that
their quotes sounded "negative". When reminded that the primary emphasis of the
Learning History was on the things gone wrong in the implementation of hard-top doors
relative to the door sag problem, the personnel still remained preoccupied with avoiding
any "negative" remarks.
5.4.2 Espoused values
A manager who was considered a key supporter of the Learning History process
commented on the concern about the selected quotes. This person stated:
"I don't want to be seen as a 'nay-sayer '. People learn best when you
reinforce positive things. I want people to know that I said some positive
things about the hard-top door implementation. "
When questioned about the value of learning from mistakes and the need to candidly
address issues in the learning history, the manager commented that the organization would
not readily accept such feedback.
The PTO has a process where the "things gone right" and the "things gone
wrong" for a project are formally evaluated at project completion. The product of this
process is typically a large document of bullet points and sentences giving some pros and
cons of the project. The existence of this process espoused the belief that equal value was
placed on learning from mistakes as well as victories.
5.4.3 Basic assumptions
To understand the seeming incongruity between the espoused values and the actual
behavior of managers in the group, the supportive manager was again questioned. At this
point, a concern was expressed relative to making other manager(s) feel that someone was
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"pointing the finger" at their area(s). The other managers who were interviewed echoed
these sentiments. One manager said that the quotes had to be restated in a more
"politically correct" manner because of the potential for the quotes to be taken out of
context by some other manager, or to have them feel that someone was "pointing the
finger" at their area. These conversations along with other supporting data led to the
formulation of a shared basic assumption, or theory-in-use:
Managers must avoid conveying information that is negative or
potentially embarrassing for another managers area.
The implied underlying assumptions are numerous: relationships could be damaged; there
might be some form of repercussion; a manager is expected to have his or her "turf'
controlled enough such that problematic or embarrassing situations do not catch the
attention of other managers - negative data then questions management skill. Each of
these issues may have been a factor. This is suggested because the managers readily
discussed the issues in private, but balked at public dissemination due to reluctance to
"point the finger" at another manager.
The "things gone right and wrong" report also reflected the hesitancy to convey
negative information about specific areas. In 55 pages of documentation concerning the
case vehicle launch and production ramp-up, there were only a few ambiguous references
to problems with the door. In fact, in the initial perusal the document seemed to be
absent of door issues. A more rigorous search found the references, and noted that the
tone of the "things gone right" section differed from that of the "things gone wrong"
section. The positive comments usually identified specific departments or functions; the
negative comments were generally not specific to areas and were weighted with issues
related to shortfallings of the vendors involved in the product launch.
5.4.4 Implications
The propensity to make negative issues undiscussable appears to be a barrier to
learning which is operating within the PTO culture. This works to inhibit the surfacing of
important issues, as has been evidenced in this analysis. In this case, although the non-
management personnel were more comfortable with their candid quotes being used almost
verbatim in the learning history, they also had an increased measure of anonymity relative
to the managers. Although no names were used, the learning history originally
distinguished personnel by title in order to help illuminate the context of the expressed
perspective. Although the titles were eliminated, because of statistics (i.e. less managers
in the population), comments from managers were perhaps more easily distinguished than
those of non-managers. In situations where anonymity is not possible, non-management
personnel may model the managers behavior and also hesitate to convey negative
information. The "things gone right and wrong" report is compiled by all levels of
personnel associated with a project, but it is distributed as a document from the platform
executive. It is not discernible whether the document was composed such that negative
information appeared more palatable, or if the door issues were not discussed as part of
the document.
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5.5 Conclusion
5.5.1 Culture
It is likely that the undiscussability of negative issues is not limited to the case of
the managers in the preceding cultural analysis. Such undiscussability was a contributing
factor to the inhibitory loop (figure 14) which resulted in the lack of teamwork in
resolution of the door sag issue. When personnel attempted to address the issues, the
defensive response evoked feelings of helplessness and blame, which eventually caused the
issue to become undiscussable. Therefore, undiscussability not only impedes double-loop
learning, but is also an impediment to single-loop learning as illustrated by the lack of
teamwork in resolving the door sag issue.
5.5.2 Learning History: Double-loop learning tool
The learning history interview process elicited candid information which had been
previously undiscussable. The reaction to potential dissemination and subsequent analysis
of the learning history brought the undiscussability of the issues to the surface, and
revealed a potential theory-in-use by management personnel. In these respects, the
learning history has the potential to be a useful tool for double-loop learning. Clearly, it is
the discretion and decision of the participants whether or not the learning history will be
used in this fashion, and whether the theory-in-use and its underlying values will be
restructured.
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.0 Introduction
As has been evidenced in the research, organizational learning is a field laced with
technical and behavioral challenges. In its efforts to become a learning organization, the
PTO is faced with some unique issues due to its structure and cultural norms. It seeks to
enhance organizational learning while maintaining the proper balance between the
autonomy of the platform teams and the collaboration needed for single- and double-loop
learning. This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for the PTO based on
the research and prevalent theory related to organizational learning.
6.1 Enhancine the Learning System
These recommendations are presented in order to assist the PTO in addressing the
questions introduced in section 1.1 of this research. A team of internal learning advocates
along with external participants may provide the optimal facilitation for this effort because
of the balanced perspectives encompassed in such a group.
1. Revisit the organizations' vision for learning. This entails identifying the desired
qualities of how the PTO will function as a "learning organization". If a shared vision is
not yet established, then the strategies found in The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook may assist
in its development.
2. Explore the organizational culture, seeking to understand the theories-in-use of the
organization, its learning oriented aspects as well as its barriers to learning. Using a
framework such as that presented by Schein in Organizational Culture and Leadership is
recommended. Other tools for analysis include those found in chapter eight of Argyris'
Overcoming Organizational Defenses, and use of learning histories with subsequent
discussion and analysis similar to that in the preceding chapter.
3. Develop skills and tools across the organization to assist in overcoming the identified
barriers. Continue and broaden the "Leading Learning Communities" work that is
underway. Along with this training, the Argyris and Senge books provide exercises for
the development of these skills.
4. Focus on making the environment more conducive to learning. An environment
void of barriers to learning is insufficient to stimulate learning. There should be processes
and strategies in place to help continually explore and restructure organizational theories-
in-use as needed. All of the tools described above may be helpful for this. Additionally,
some form of sensitivity training to help identify and reduce barriers within and between
platform teams may also support this effort. When teams are newly formed or experience
a great deal of personnel turn-over, team-building exercises may also be appropriate.
Finally, periodic job-rotation and cross-functional training will help team members
understand each others' requirements and constraints.
6.2 Book of Knowledge Development
The following actions are recommended for the continued development of the
Book of Knowledge:
1. Dedicate resources from each manufacturing group represented in the book (i.e.
stamping, assembly, etc.) to lead development of the best practices for their areas. The
lack of documented best practices was identified as an inhibitor to the development of the
book. Dedicated resources from these groups and others (e.g. Tech Clubs) will facilitate
its completion.
2. Integrate use of information in the book with primary responsibilities of end-users
to add inherent value and incentive for use. This will help address the concerns about
the book being an "encyclopedia" rather than a living document. Examples of strategies
to accomplish this include real-time postings of plant issues, results from continuous
improvement workshops and learning laboratory line updates as opposed to hard
documentation.
3. Use on-line bulletin board areas as forums for exploring underlying assumptions of
the information listed (Le bestpractices) and recommending appropriate change& As
recognized by the lead-user group, such feedback provides opportunities for both single-
and double-loop learning.
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6.3 Tech Clubs
In order to address the issues revealed in the survey, the following items are
recommended with recognition that some clubs may have already accomplished these
actions:
1. Elevate the status of the clubs by adding responsibility and authority. In order for the
clubs to achieve their purpose they should have both responsibility for tasks and the
authority to complete the tasks. Standards definition and best practice development are
two areas where the clubs' leadership would prove very beneficial.
2. Provide incentivesfor participation. As discussed in the research, many participants
have relative disincentives for participation. Once the first recommendation has been
implemented, the perceived value of participation in the clubs should rise. After this is
accomplished, then additional incentives for participation may also help the situation.
Specifically, tech club participation should be an explicit performance expectation for the
members, with opportunity for reward when participation is outstanding.
3. Encourage development of the clubs asforumsfor double-loop learning. If the
clubs take leadership in best practice and standard development, then they have the
opportunity to explore the underlying assumptions.
6.4 Door Issues
6.4.1 Experimentation
1. Continue designed experimentation to increase understanding of the interaction
between assembly process andproduct design factors. In the case of door sag, an
expanded DOE should be run to quantify the effects the contributing factors referenced in
the chapter.
2. Continue to build the linkage between vendor designers and plant concerns. The
identification and resolution of the hinge issue may have been hastened with earlier
participation of the vendor designers.
6.4.2 Door Learning History
1. Begin dissemination of the information within the door systems group and continue
dissemination of the information across platform teams. Learning history and proposed
workshop invitation included in Appendix C.
2. Develop internal resources for creating learning histories; include external
participants (ifpossible) for varied perspective. Learning histories should be created in
teams of 2 - 4 people, so that workload is manageable. If external resources are used,
then a team with one or two other PTO resources would suffice, assuming the external
resource has time devoted solely for the creation of the history.
APPENDIX A
Tech Club Survey Research Plan
This document outlines the research plan that will carried out in the study of
Organizational Learning within a Platform Team environment. The research will be
conducted for a ten week period beginning October 3, 1995.
Hypothesis: Communication patterns within Tech Clubs is being studied; the hypothesis is
that Clubs with well defined objectives and which meet regularly will show a higher
communication index than those with no explicit objectives (i.e. less clear) and that have
less frequent meetings.
To evaluate the hypothesis, an experiment has been devised following design 17.6 in
Foundations of Behavioral Research by Kerlinger.
Four group form - Experimental and Control
Yb X Ya Experimental
Yb (~X) Ya Control 1
Mr X Ya Control 2 (Exp. 2)
(-X) Ya Control 3
The only difference between this design and design 17.6 is that the groups are matched
(hence the Mr ). The matching is inherent (in part) because the study involves specific
Tech Clubs. In addition, the meeting frequency has influenced which groups are
experimental and which are control. Because the intended intervention is a Tech Club
meeting (which I will attend), only the Clubs that meet more often than quarterly could be
considered for the experimental groups. From the candidate Clubs, the final designation
was randomly assigned (by the flip of a coin).
Yb observations will be made during the (approximate) period of 10/3 - 11/3. During this
time, five to seven members from each club will be randomly selected each week for the
telephone survey detailed in the attached script. The intervention(s) will take place during
last week in October or first week in November. After this Ya observations will be made
following the same sampling plan and script. All data will be collected using the attached
form; once the data has been collected, intra-group communication indices ( CA ) will be
calculated according to equation one from Managing the Flow of Technology:
Na Na
CA=( ki )/Na(Na- 1)
k=1 i=1
where: CA= strength of communication index within group A
cm = 1, when person k reports weekly communication with person 1 or vice versa
= 0, elsewise
Na = number of members of group A
Tech Club Survey Script
* Hello, this is Cheryl Oates in the -------- Group. I was wondering if you have two or
three minutes to answer a brief telephone survey?
* Can you name a colleague with whom you spoke today concerning an important
technical issue?
* Why did you select this colleague?
* Where does (this colleague) work? (platform team and work group)
* Can you give me a brief summary of the issue?
* Can you name a colleague with whom you spoke today concerning a technical issue
related to ? (the functional or technical nature of the club)
* Why did you select this colleague?
* Where does (this colleague) work? (platform team and work group)
* Can you give me a brief summary of the issue?
--~~ Intervention questions ~~~
* Do you typically attend Tech Club meetings? (If not, why)
* Can you tell me about the last meeting that you attended?
- When was it?
- Was there anything specific gained that helped you do your job better or
different?
- Do you often get such input from a meeting (i.e. was this unusual?)
* Are there certain members of your TC that you speak with (i.e. 2 or more times/month)
on technical issues? Who are they?
* Also collected background information on the club members
APPENDIX B
Door weld statistical results
Two sample T for Standard welds (Std) vs. Extra welds (Extra)
N Mean StDev SE Mean
Std 69 3.333 0.748 0.090
Extra 44 3.003 0.681 0.100
95% C. I. for mu Std - mu Extra: (0.059, 0.60)
T-Test mu Std = mu Extra (vs not =): T = 2.41 P = 0.018 DF = 97
P < 0.05 therefore results statistically significant
Bartlett's Test (normal distribution)
Test statistic: 0.456
p value: 0.499
Data fits normal distribution
APPENDIX C
Learning History Methodology and Acknowledgment
This learning history has been prepared as a means to document significant learning
associated with hard-top door design and implementation, and to assist with the transfer of
this knowledge across the PTO. To accomplish this, interviews were held with numerous
people on the platform team to record their perspective of the things gone right and wrong
with the design and implementation of hard-top doors for the case study vehicle. These
perspectives were then compiled and analyzed for recurring themes that represented
pivotal issues for the platform team. These themes are the foundation of the learning
history.
The author gratefully acknowledges the participation of the platform team in the
preparation of this document. The reflection, insight and candor of everyone involved
proved essential to the process of making the learning history a "living document" that
speaks with the collective knowledge and experience of its contributors. In addition, the
management of the platform team must be applauded for their willingness to volunteer the
organization as a learning laboratory. Hopefully, the learning history will stimulate
discussion and evoke actions that support the PTO's commitment to organizational
learning.
Things gone right
The phenomenal success of the case study vehicle is affirmation of the large number of
"things gone right" for the car. The accomplishments of platform team personnel enabled
the PTO to achieve a goal that other automakers had been unable to attain: volume
production of a profitable small car. This feat required extensive effort from everyone
involved with the vehicle. In recognition of this, each individual interviewed commented
on the hard work and dedication of the people involved in developing and producing this
vehicle. Numerous significant technical accomplishments were noted for the door system
including: a well coordinated Geometric Dimensioning and Tolerancing scheme with the
datum and PLP's defined early in the process; a good door panel build process and the
development of a new door hanging process; use of Variation Simulation Modeling
Techniques (V-SAT) to simulate the assembly process; product and process variation
reduction in design and assembly. These achievements helped the door systems group
package a large glass into a relatively small door, implementing the cab forward design
that has helped the case study vehicle remain a customer favorite.
It is very important to celebrate accomplishments and positively reinforce successful
behavior so that the organization learns to repeat the pattern. Experience has shown that
learning histories are most beneficially employed when initiated with an emphasis on the
positive. This is not difficult to do: platform team personnel can consider how far the
organization, its people, and its leadership have come rather than notice that there is still a
gap between where they are and ideal. The case study vehicle program was the first time
that platform team personnel from diverse functions worked together on a vehicle from
concept to volume production. This was a significant accomplishment in its own right.
Were there "things gone wrong" along the way? Of course. Every corporation has some
oversights in the execution of its programs and plans. Mistakes are an inevitable part of
life, as is learning from mistakes. What is not as common is to be able to talk openly and
honestly about the things gone wrong in a process, and to help develop a learning process
to subsequently avoid some of the things gone wrong the second time around.
Things gone wrong
The learning history attempts to answer the question "what went wrong for the case study
vehicle hard-top door implementation?", with specific attention to the issue of door sag.
As the reader will note, the focus is not on individual technical issues but on human issues
that often work to impede efficient technical resolution of the problem. Many people
agree that American organizations typically possess the technical expertise necessary for
success; the difficulty lies in the execution of specific processes and procedures which
enable the organization to achieve its goals.
A note on reading the Learning History
The format for the learning history is the "jointly told tale". There are no "rules"
concerning how to read the document, but the following explanation and suggestions may
help. The contributors to the learning history are only identified by functional group title
e.g. engineering or manufacturing. This helps shift the focus from the person speaking to
the issue being discussed. The document has sections of exposition and analysis completed
by the author which stretch across the page. Under each theme are two columns. The
italicized left hand column is analysis prepared by the author; it is a "conversation starter"
meant to ask questions and expose issues or implications that may be buried in the
comments on the right hand column of the page. This section may be skimmed first or
entirely avoided until after the individual quote has been read. The right hand column
contains quotes from people interviewed for the learning history. The quotes are grouped
by chronology whenever possible to document facts and events. But the learning history
focuses on what people thought about the event, how they perceived their own actions
and the actions of others. By recreating the experience of "being there", the learning
history helps the reader understand what happened and presents perspectives that are not
always discussed in typical business settings.
The reader is asked to do two things when reading the learning history:
First, use it as a vehicle to better conversations. Read the document simultaneously with
other team members in preparation for a workshop to discuss the content of the learning
history and how it applies to the team's efforts. Second, take on the mind set of a
beginner when reading. Listen to what people say and why they did what they did. Try
to suspend your judgment; don't automatically condemn the people who made mistakes,
or make assumptions about why the mistakes occurred. Yet notice how you react. Mark
those reactions in the document. Think about how this story is similar and different from
issues that face your team. Be prepared to talk to other team members about your
reactions and thoughts in reading this document. Come to the workshop prepared to learn
with one another about this learning and change initiative and its implications for your
efforts.
What does it take to get a group of talented individuals to work as a high performance,
effective team? The case study corporation has been lauded for knowing what to do by
forming its Platform Team Organization (PTO) structure. Initiated for vehicle design and
assembly, the PTO has been credited with breathing new life into the company by
developing award-winning vehicles.
While the successes have been applauded, has the PTO taken time to learn from its
failures? The platform team has had enormous success with its case study vehicle, but the
Achilles heel for the car has been a problem with sag in the hard-top door. Despite the
overall effectiveness of the platform team, the issue of door sag has not been successfully
resolved.
TEAMWORK
A major factor contributing to the problem of door sag is the apparent lack of teamwork
in resolving the issue. Perceived barriers between groups within the door systems team
has inhibited effective communication and negatively affected teamwork. Differences in
education level, experience and functional alliances are but a few of the barriers that the
team must overcome to build more effective communication and teamwork.
COMMUNICA TION OF ISSUES:
Communication of the issues
between gro0ups is not siuccessful.
This is due in part to the
questionable root cause cf door
sag.
Teamwork seems hindered by
cycles of blame and denial within
door, groups.
There are numerous exanmples
of "dra'l'ing sides" where team-
work is hindered by a "them vs.
us" attitude.
Drcn,'ing Sides:
Manutfacturing vs. Engineering
Engineering - person A
Ever since I've started, I've heard complaints about
the door sag issue. And there have been
discussions about is the sag in the door, is it in the
hinge, and a lot of animosity between groups. The
Plastics Lab says it's in the hinge, the Design
Engineers don't want to believe the hinge is the
problem, they want to believe it's in the door, but
yet when we go and look at possible changes to the
that does nothing.
For about three months, we waited for direction,
then we just got fed up with the lack of teamwork,
and went to our management and got an agreement
that we could investigate it on our own. When
we came back with the results, that was when
Design started listening to us.
Manufacturing - person B
We (the manufacturing side) were trying to convey
messages to Product design, and they were just
brushing our suggestions under the rug and kind of
avoiding us. Trying not to comply with our
demands, you know?
Manufacturing - person D
It went in one ear and out of the other.
guess they understood my concern, but
do anything about it.
I mean, I
they didn't
Drcaving Sides:
Manufacturing vs. Engineering
Perceived lack of
teamwork allows problem to
continue unsolved - groiups
"give up "
Door engineering personnel
iwere .sitched from sheet
metal to fidl door responsibility -
new working relationships
resulted and team effectiveness
was hindered due to learning curve
effects.
A distinct difference in the
(expressed) assessment of the
level of teamwork
Engineering guys don't quite understand what we
see while we are having a problem ... that we are
concerned about this because of the plants. They
don't quite understand the severity of our concern.
Now on our side, we couldn't help Engineering. We
know there's a problem, but they're saying, "tell me
what I should do, tell me what I should change to"
and we couldn't begin to tell them how to change the
design to improve it. We can only very broadly tell
them what they need to do, but we can't tell them in
specifics. When we did try, they said "it's too
expensive, too late, etc.". So we just gave up.
Engineering - person C
During launch the platform was split into two
groups and most of the door engineering folks were
new. (When the problem showed up in production)
we're coming in new and trying to figure out
everything that was going on, so there was time -- as
well as the knowledge factor -- trying to get the
history of everything that went wrong.
It took some of us maybe six months to figure out
that there was an issue going on, maybe not really
understanding exactly what was causing it, but that
there was something going on there.
I didn't notice any major roadblocks, if that's the
right word there. Everyone seemed to be working
well together. If anything -- It's like anything after
awhile. There were noticeably some arguments
about the system, and the right things to do, or the
wrong things to do. And those issues get resolved.
didn't see any major roadblocks or stumbling blocks
in the way that stopped anything from progressing.
Manufactu ring - person F
I tried to communicate to my cohorts at the research
center about the problems that we were having in
the plant. They seemed to be cooperative -- wanting
to listen. I see that we listened but we didn't do
anything about it. Here we are two years later and
we still have the same problems that wehad when we
started.
FEEDBACK - CLOSING THE LOOP:
People weren't sure of progress
made on the problem, test results
or how tests iwere run. The lack of
communication builds mistrust
and animosity. This negatively
reinforcing cycle firther erodes
team efforts.
Lack of feedback may not have
been intentional, but the impact
is continued mistrust and
animosity.
Who is responsible for closing
the feedback loop?
Manufacturing - person B
I think that Product wants to keep their own little.
entity separate from Manufacturing and everyone
else involved. They have their own little secretive
labs, I mean, they are invited out to the shops, they
look at all of our processes, but they want to keep to
themselves.
I don't have a full understanding of what they do,
how they set up tests. I feel that if we are going to
work as a team, everybody ought to be involved. I
mean, they stick their nose into our business, and
they want to keep their side kind of hidden to the
rest of the PTO world.
Engineering - person C
I always fed information back -- but whether it went
back to the right people or not is another story. You
communicate with whom you deal with ... that may
be 2 or 3 folks on a team. Closing the loop is a hard
thing; maybe that's where some of the errors and the
personal feelings kind of get involved, when the loop
isn't completely closed to the requester's
satisfaction.
Maybe we did a poor job in telling them why we
didn't -- we couldn't make changes. Maybe we
thought we came across and we didn't come across
that much. Maybe it's because of the defensive
mechanisms kicking in. We just didn't close the loop
effectively enough.
RELA TIONSHIPS:
Frustration due to the unsolved
problem helps.further animosity
between groups
Drawiing Sides:
Lab A vs Lab B
Drawning Sides:
Product vs Manufacturing
Manufacturing - person F
I don't know how much actual testing was done.
I'm sure we did test but I have no data on the
testing. It's not their job to furnish me with results.
But when we came up with data that showed there
was a problem with the hinge or the door, they never
gave us data that said we were wrong or right.
Engineering - person E
It certainly is our intent to keep communications open
and to keep everyone involved. Sometimes you get
caught up in your own work and leave someone out,
but when that happens it's unintentional.
Engineering - person A
(The animosity is obvious in) the backstabbing
comments you hear. It's all "they", it's never person,
said this; it's the Plastic's Modeling Lab, or the
Stress Lab, "they" say this, "they" say that.
It's the way we are referring to each other behind
our backs. It makes me feel very uncomfortable
working on this project.
Manufacturing - person B
It seemed that there was a lot of mud slinging going
on between the Product people (Engineering) and
all of Manufacturing, at the research center and the
plant. At one point, the plant personnel were so fed
up that they told a few of the Product guys 'why
don't you just quit coming down here, you are
wasting the company money and time; it's not really
worth you just coming down here to throw up a little
smoke screen.'
There were some nasty notes generated that pointed
the whole problem on process, written to higher ups.
I know I've told people that their product was poor
which was (I guess in the way that I conveyed my
message) mudslinging because I wasn't really
political about it, but it was true, and it just seemed
that we didn't really work together on this problem
as a team.
Drcmwing Sides:
Engineering vs Plant
Is there room for individual
pride in a team effort?
Drcawing Sides:
Body Shop vs Glass Install
Drawming Sides:
Degreed vs Non-degreed
Union vs Non-union
Engineering - person C
The assembly plant pointed (all the problems)
everything in the body shop. It seemed that's where
the problem is. I think it is at the plant level.
There was a lot of in-plant fighting.
The biggest issue has to be the understanding or the
misunderstanding between Engineering and the plant
after the fact, after Design. I think we were all talking
and trying to do the same thing, but the defense
mechanisms go in at a certain point. And this is all
human nature. You're proud of what you did and
someone points a finger and says that could be done
better, you dig your heels in and say -- "It's right.
We've proved it. It's right. It's there." And so that
was some of the barriers that were hard to work
through when we first started as a new group
coming in.
Manufacturing - person F
I feel that a lot of the problems to begin with weren't
necessarily due to the body shop. I feel that our counter-
parts on the other side of the house installing the glass was
a big part of the problem. They would call us over and say
that the door position was a problem, but the doors were
okay. We would get blamed for problems on the other
side that weren't really our problem.
Manufacturing - person B
I talked with my manager and the Engineering
manager about the problem. He was just avoiding
the issue. He didn't want to help, you know, he was
very sarcastic the way he talked. He kind of would
talk down to us. A lot of Process Engineers aren't
educated with degrees, where Product people are.
We are a Union, they are non-Union. I feel that I
don't get a lot of respect from Product people
because of these issues. It's not a real harmonious
working atmosphere.
OVERALL RESULT: LESS
EFFECTIVE TEAMWORK
Example: Wasted effort and
unsuccessfiul design
Drawing Sides:
Training vs. Experience
Product ivs. Process
Example: Process input on
test accuracy not given
Example: Additional engineering,
analysis not done
Manufacturing - person D
Oh there's always conflicts in the teams. The younger
(product) engineers are better trained, but they really
don't quite know how to design fixtures. They would
try to design the fixtures and some of the older
(process) engineers would sit back and let them do it,
and let them screw it up just to have a little fun. You
know how those guys are. It was a problem, but it
worked out, I guess, eventually.
Manufacturing - person B
You know, if I saw how they were setting up a test,
maybe I would say, 'well, is that the right way to
do it to check the correct sag here, or would you
want to do this.' But that doesn't happen.
Engineering - person A
Sometimes it gets very frustrating, and sometimes,
just in my own group, we throw up our hands and
say 'well, if they won't listen, what can we do?' We
could help them, but they don't want the help. And
other times when you feel just real strongly and it's
something you can do on your own just to test it, then
we will go ahead and test it. Sometimes we are
wrong, sometimes we are right, and we just go from
there.
While perceived barriers between groups hinder effective teamwork and subsequent
resolution of the issue, numerous other factors influence the case study vehicle door sag
problem. A most basic issue is the identification of the problem. Does anyone really
understand exactly why and how a door sags? If so, can the problem be solved?
PROBLEM SOLVING
A significant reason why the door sag problem has not been successfully resolved is the
complexity of the problem. Its root cause is tangled in the interdependencies of the door
system and the assembly process. Solving such a compounded problem requires a high
level of teamwork, analytical skills, time and effort. The learning curve associated with
hard-top door implementation and the relative inexperience of some personnel impeded
the problem solving effort for door sag.
A LEARNING CURVE:
The PTO does not appear to have a
good method for transferring
klnowledge across platforms so that
recurritg problems are avoided and
significant learnings are captured A
Learning Histoiy may be a start for
this process.
It is a vely necessaiyjob - to "keepl
things going ". If you get the job
done while other areas (?f the project
suffer have you successfully
completed the job?
Engineering - person C
I think some of the problems came about
because it was the first time in a long time
that anybody in our area had done any
design with the hard-top system. Most of
the people who had worked on earlier
hard-top designs were either retired or
moved to another project somewhere else
in the corporation. So, there was a big
learning curve and we didn't have that
knowledge base to fall back on.
There were a lot of things going on. We had
done lots of testing and had data piled up to
the ceiling. We were trying to analyze it real
quickly, and keep things going - everyone
was busy doing their job. There wasn't a lot
of time left over to analyze and evaluate
what was really going on during the build-
up, when we may have been able to make
design changes.
Engineering - person E
We picked the hard-top door knowing that
the glass system would be difficult ..
something we'd really have to control. After
the decision was made to go hard-top and
we were at a point of no return, the decision
was made to move to a doors off process.
We had to do this because of OSHA and
ergonomic considerations. After that,
adjusting the door fit became a bigger issue
because the doors off process doesn't allow
compensation for the door fit after the glass
is adjusted.
I think that if someone had foreseen the
problems that we were going to have then
maybe we would have gone through some
panic phase to change the door. But other
areas would have been affected, like the
aperture... if we had changed the door we
A QUESTION OF EXPERIENCE:
Is it neces.sary for an individual on a
cross-fiunctional team to have cross-
fimctional experience ?
It seems that the skills of the two
groups should comp7liment each
other. Howiever, these skills appear
mutually exclusive at times. Is there
a better way to team individuals to
get the proper mix of experience alnd
knowledge? Is a non-degreed
product engineer or degreed process
engineer an option?
How does one find the balance
between finding (quick) solutions to
everyday problems and performingI
the detailed analysis for solutions to
be implemented in the long term?
Personnel transitions shouldt alloiw
time for cross-training -- not only,
training in the/jobhfunction but
trallnsferring information abolut i.ssues
or problems.
would have had to do some really difficult
things with the rest of the car.
Manufacturing - person D
We saw early on that there were going to be
problems. But sometimes I guess it's easier
to take the excuse than to pursue the
solution that you know is not easy. I think
what happened was that we didn't have
people that could come up with solutions to
the problem that was identified. That was
probably due to general inexperience and
perhaps a lack of cross-functional
experience.
Process Engineers, in general, are very well
experienced. They've spent years on the
same products and they've seen all kinds of
problems. They have experience, but not
really knowledge - they may not understand
why a certain thing works. Some of the new
young Product Engineers, they have the
knowledge, but they don't know what to do
because they lack experience.
Engineering - person A
It seems there's a lack of insight because
people have not worked long enough in a
group to have seen problems on another
vehicle and to carry over those experiences
to the next vehicle. Sometimes I get the
impression that everyone is so caught up in
today's fire that they don't look ahead and
think if there could be a problem with this in
the future, or if the work they're doing now
could affect something down the road. They
are just looking at today's fire, and how to
get through it.
Manufacturing - person B
In Manufacturing, I was given the door
system at the end of Pilot and I followed it
all the way through to the plant. In Product,
Is there a method for documenting
fifmdamental questions and answ'eirs
for use in training new personnel?
UNDERSTANDING
REQUIREMENTS:
It is difficult to come ip 1with a
mutually agreeable solution unless
the involved parties uncerstand each
there were numerous times that they handed
off door systems to various Product
Engineers. It seems a lot of communication
and knowledge was lost in the hand-off.
Manufacturing - person G
It's tough to solve a problem when a team
has a lot of personnel turnover. In the plant
we end up with a lot of turnover in the door
setting area. The area is frequently observed
by engineers and other team members to
evaluate the process for improvement, and
some operators don't like the added
attention. We have made changes to the
process to reduce operator sensitivity.
However, some portions of the door
installing process can still be operator
sensitive, so turnover of people can cause a
problem.
In Door Hardware the design supervisor,
senior engineer and product engineer have
changed. It makes teamwork difficult
because we're starting at the beginning with
each new person who is added to the team
over the course of long term problem
resolution.
The Process Engineering group has turnover
in another sense related to overtime
equalization. If you want a process engineer
you can get the person you need for a while,
but then he's high on overtime hours. This
causes us to start the process with an
engineer who is new to the specific issues the
team has been working on, or to continue on
without firsthand process engineering
support.
Man ufactu ring - person B
We tried to get changes to the door, but
nobody from Manufacturing really
understood what it takes to design a door, to
other 's constraints and
requirements.
When interdependencies are nol
understood, the result can be that
individual parts are optimized, but
the system does not per)form as
expected
FINDING THE ROOT CA USE:
The rush to produce a finished
product reduces the time allotted to
peifect the product.
get prototype pieces made to test it out. It
seemed to us that when we asked for what
we thought was a simple change we were
given ridiculous dates like a year to a year
and a half to come up with something. We
really weren't sure if they (design) had a
good grasp of what it actually takes to build
a door, because they didn't seem to
understand our problems.
Engineering - person C
I don't know if Manufacturing understood
how the design process actually works, or
when and how changes can be made.
Sometimes they may have thought a certain
change was easy to make when there were
actually a lot of ramifications for making that
change.
I don't think people fully understood each
other's requirements. There were probably
instances where we thought we understood
Manufacturing's requirements, and went one
way. When all was said and done, maybe it
didn't turn out exactly as they would have
liked.
The biggest issue that's out there right now is
understanding the total interdependencies of
all the door systems and the body. For
example, we went through with a certain
parameter to set the door to the body for
gaps. Another group set the parameters for
the glass adjustment (for sealing).
Individually, each parameter seemed okay.
But when the two were put together, we
ended up with a lot more variation than we
really thought we had.
Engineering - person C
We never really stopped the pilot
productions to find out what was going right
and what was going wrong. There was
The PTO has institutionalized the
Kepner-Trego problem sohling
process to assist in decision analysis
and root cause identification. Were
these tools (or others) used to helpl
with this problem ?
Are people rewarded or punished.for
bringing out problems?
There seems to be a perception that
a person mtust be able to 'fix" all (?f
the problems in his or her area. This
can discourage or delay peoplekfromn
surfacing dif.ficult problems.
always a push to build the vehicle that
reduced our time for problem solving.
Manufacturing - person B
I think you basically have people that don't
know how to use data to work through a
problem correctly. It didn't seem like they
followed trouble shooting procedures, or
used tools like a fishbone chart.
Engineering - person E
Most of the time when things aren't getting
done it doesn't mean that no one's working
on the problem. It usually means that the
problem is not easy to solve.
Manufacturing - person G
One issue is that process engineers are not
set up to function as plant-level problem
solvers. This isn't their fault -- it's systemic.
They are asked to manage the funding and
the timing. The contracted vendor is
expected to do the design. We have team
design and fabrication reviews. But it is very
difficult to predict how a process is going to
function when it's only on paper, or when
it's in a build shop cycling and it's not
observed at production speeds using
production parts. When we do get the
process in the plant we can watch it run and
see where there are issues that need
improvement. It's at this point in time that
we need the most support from problem
solvers, and we seem to come up short for
one reason or another.
Once we get processes and designs into the
plant, we get a lot of feedback as to which
processes and designs are top priority and
which need to be improved the quickest.
One problem is that we each tend to be slow
to react to our portion or responsibility on
the big major issues. It's like we say to
ourselves, "I have a few problems I need to
work on, but by no means is my area of
Who is responsible.for sfolv/ing a
problem? If everyone is does that
mean that no one is?
responsibility the biggest root cause. I might
not even need to improve my portion at all if
the other areas improved themselves". We
all tend to sit back and wait it out to see if
the other areas improving will make the
situation better. Then finally we each realize
that to totally lock up our top platform issues
it takes fixing each and every problem related
to a certain issue. In the end we fix what
needs fixing but the waiting to see what
happens makes it take much longer than it
should.
Manufacturing - person D
Problem solving is really tricky, you know?
It's not enough to have a person or a team
working on the problem, you really need
some people with hands on experience that
can come up with creative ideas for changing
the product or process.
Eventually, a manufacturing executive was
given the responsibility to lead the problem
solving effort. He assigned the task to an
engineer. The only problem was that the kid
was a new graduate; he was good as far as
documenting information and trying to
coordinate meetings, but I think that he
lacked some experience in solving problems.
But anyway, once they had someone
assigned to it and had formed a team, I sort
of backed out of it because I had so much
other stuff to get done.
RIGID / CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
A significant factor in the case study vehicle door issues is rigid and sometimes conflicting
objectives for the program. The case study vehicle platform team sought to develop a
profitable small car - which had been unheard of for domestic automakers in recent years.
In order to meet this goal, calculated risks were taken to make the car as lightweight and
low cost as possible. The hard-top door design was implemented for its styling and
weight benefit, but with the known risk of related wind noise and water leak issues. While
customer satisfaction data suggests that this car has fared better than other PTO products
in those categories, the problem of door sag and other design / assembly issues have
prompted reevaluation of the hard-top door design.
STRICTADHERENCE TO COST
AND WEIGHT OBJECTIVES
Program olbjectives.for a light weight
low cost vehicle heavily in!fluenced
the door design, perhaps at the
expense of robustness.
Engineering - person E
Cost and weight were two of the most
important goals to achieve without
sacrificing quality. We did extraordinary
things to get cost and weight out of the car.
We were daring, we took a lot of risks and
we were creative. We did what I think was
an exceptional job.
Engineering - person C
Well, the case study vehicle was the first
vehicle that we did where we really had cost
constraints laid on us. Usually in past times
there was a group that was kind of
controlling costs; engineers were never privy
to detailed information and there seemed to
be more flexibility in the cost objective. So
now cost was very strictly followed and
engineers were responsible.
The objective of the car was to be made with
the cost of another PTO vehicle as its target.
That car had been out of production already
for two or three years and it was a low-
priced car, so this objective was quite a
challenge. The result was a lot of internal
pressure to maintain costs. First of all the
focus was not to go over the budgeted dollar
amount. If you did, that money had to be
approved. And if the money was approved,
the idea was to try to get that money
someplace else out of the car. So a lot of the
designs were cost driven early in the
program.
Manufacturing - person B
It seems that we were limited in budget, and
they wanted to make this a real lightweight
car. Trying to achieve those goals, they
maybe put the other objectives to the
wayside, or they weren't really concentrating
on making the door robust.
Manufacturing - person D
The Program Manager adapted an objective
management type of technique; the defined
objectives of the case study vehicle program
were piece cost, investment and functional
objectives to meet measurable customer
expectations. Other objectives, such as
process capability and hours per car, were
less well defined but still very important to
us. Unfortunately, the objectives of
investment and piece cost were so strong
that they overshadowed those other
priorities.
By the time that the vehicle was launched, the problems with the door had surfaced and
everyone struggled with the best way to resolve the problem. Was it too late to spend
money to modify the door design?
PROBLEMS SURFA CE
Is there a way to identify and
approve of additional vspending
before the structure is set?
Engineering - person E
We were immersed in a situation that
mandated that we design a small car to meet
very aggressive functional, cost, weight and
investment targets. After it was determined
how much we didn't spend, in the last 6-8
months before launch management said
'okay spend some money to make it even
better'. By then the structure was set and the
additional money that was spent did not
achieve the level of results that could have
been accomplished if these dollars were
available earlier in the program.
Manufacturing - person B
It didn't seem like product was held
accountable for the performance of their
design at launch. During this time we
wanted to get the cars out as quick as
possible to meet cycle time objectives, with
the best quality possible. When
improvements were made, more of the
Is the spending decision based on
economic analysis qf the cost vs.
benefit or is it an attempt to conceal
a systemic error of underspending?
Who has the resplonsibiliy: of?
reconciling oljectives thai seem to
conflict?
PERFORMVANCE OBJEC I 77I ES
There is a perceplion witlhin
Engineering thal plant audit criteria
don't correlate to customer
satisfaction measures. The
implication is that the plant incentive
structure encourages attention to
issues that are of benefit to the plant
but are of questionable henelfi to the
customer.
Has this perception led Engineeringz
emphasis was put on the manufacturing
process than on engineering issues.
I think this emphasis had a lot to do with the
possibility of increasing the cost and weight
of the vehicle if they made (design)
improvements. They wanted to keep to their
target goals for weight and cost, and they
just didn't want any egg on their face. They
didn't want to admit that they had erred in
the first place by not spending the money.
Manufacturing - person D
We had conflicting objectives. Assembly
labor was considered an objective for
Manufacturing, but not for Engineering. So
even though we were working together to
reduce the assembly labor, it was still more
important to Manufacturing to control those
costs.
Engineering watched its costs by controlling
changes made to the design. When you are
holding the line on investment levels it's
expensive to start making changes. It would
have taken time and money and I think that
was the reluctancy we faced in trying to
resolve the door issues. That was a problem
that we didn't address and it hurt us.
Engineering - person E
The plant has different audits than
Engineering. Our numbers, QTS, are
customer driven. They have CSA and parts
of VQA at the plant. One of the problems is
that originally, VQA numbers didn't
correlate to customer satisfaction, they
correlated to build issues. The correlation
between VQA and our numbers have gotten
better, but we're targeting QTS numbers that
correlate to JD Powers. When it comes
down to it, the customer doesn't give two
to believe that the plant has "cried
wolf" about door problems?
This perception is refuted by plant
personnel
END RESUL 7- NEXT
GENERA TION 1"VEHICLE GETS A
DIFFERENT DOOR
Team members feel that a hard-top
door could have iworked...
... an aaren ' sure (?/f the s.ylbig
consequences of a full-fi.amecl door.
The tangible benefits associatled with
the hard-top door are outnweighed )by
the lack of robustness inherento  he
design.
hoots about a plant audit -- they're only
interested in how the car performs and its
perceived quality level.
Manufacturing - person F
The plant doesn't use VQA anymore. Our
CSA audit is based on customer satisfaction
measures. This helps us stay on top of issues
that affect the customer and the audits
correlate to JD Powers ratings.
NManufacturing - person B
A hard-top door could have worked if
money was allocated in the system to make a
more robust design. I hope the full stamped
door will help us avoid the problems we've
had up to this point.
Manufacturing - person D
I think we could have made the hard-top
door work. I like the hard-top look because
it makes the car seem roomier; I think that
helped make the car popular. I'm a little
concerned that the 2000 case study vehicle
with its full-framed door won't give the same
feeling. It's just too bad that we as a team
couldn't have made the hard-top door work
better.
Engineering - person E
The case study vehicle numbers for
windnoise are equivalent to other PTO
vehicles. In spite of this we're going to full-
framed doors for 2000 model year case study
vehicle. That decision was made because we
couldn't see how to get the robustness in the
design that we need. There were a lot of
(hidden) costs associated with hard-top
glass. We could probably solve the
windnoise issue if we want to throw a lot of
money at the car. We're not going to do that
when a full-framed door can help solve our
problem.
The case study vehicle is in its third year of production. Door sag is still an issue. In the
next major design revision hard-top doors are to be replaced with a more traditional full-
framed design. Plant personnel report that the case study plant has one of the most cost
effective stamping plants in the world because the hard-top door allows all four doors to
be made out of the same die. It's not clear if that information and the resulting capacity
and scrap issues were considered in the decision to go with a full-framed door; one can
only assume that the benefits outweigh the risks.
For case study vehicle platform the risks associated with hard-top door design have
proven to be too great. An even greater risk lies in the failure to learn from the mistakes of
the past. The door systems sub-team is attempting to learn from the things gone wrong
with the hard-top door implementation through a learning history. It is hoped that the
lessons learned from the case study vehicle hard-top experience will be used to improve
the next generation vehicle.
(The following memo is adapted from a format recommended by Reflection Learning
Associates, Cambridge, MA)
Sample Learning History Dissemination workshop memo
To: "Learning Leadership" ad hoc team
From: Learning History team
Subject: Learning History dissemination meeting
Attached you will find the learning history for the hard-top door implementation. I ask
that you read the learning history carefully and thoughtfully in preparation for our meeting
tomorrow. Please plan on spending at least a half hour, preferably an hour, uniterrupted
to read this document.
As part of our the learning process, individual and group interviews were conducted
among members of the door systems sub-team. Those interviews helped the team
members reflect on their own progress. This learning history takes what people have
shared in those reflections and distills their remarks into materials for us to consdier as a
group, along with contextual introductions and some reflective notes. What people have
said raises some important items for us to consider as a group.
When reading the learning history please note your reactions - they will be a key
component of our conversation in the meeting. Thus, mark up the document where you
feel it is appropriate. We are interested in what strikes you as important, or surprises you,
and exactly where in the text that comes from. Also as you read the right hand (story)
column narratives, please feel free to add your interpretations in the left hand
(interpretation, observation, questions) column.
In the workshop tomorrow we will talk about:
* Additonal interpretations and questions about the issues;
* Whether the issues raised here are limited just to the door systems team, or whether
they can aply toother teams and organizations throughout the corporation;
* How we can generalize from this to move forward in our projects.
We will be meeting on x/x/9x from x:xx - x:xx in the xxxx room to discuss the contents as
a group.
See you tomorrow!
A learning historian
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